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If  one  searches  for  a  rational  legal  frame~lork for  the 
financial  services  industry,  derived  from  firs,  principles 
consistently applied, one will be  disappointed in reviewing the 
history  of  that  legal  structure  in  the  United  States.  Only 
ambiguous conclusions may be drawn if  one wishes to justify the 
kinds of liberalizing measures that generally have been favored in 
academic circles since the mid-1970s. 
The United States started with a classically liberal/negative 
liberty framework regarding "monied  corporations,"  but as early as 
the 178Os,  policymakers began to make utilitarian/positive liberty 
compromises.  Gradually, traditional legal structures designed to 
encourage managerial prudence (such  as double liability for  banksr 
shareholders)  eroded,  and subsidies  that eventually led to  a severe 
moral  hazard  problem  (such as  federal  deposit  insurance) were 
inserted  in  their place.  Checks and  balances  that  originally 
existed,  such as a strong and competing role for the states in bank 
supervision  and  regulation,  gradually  collapsed  into  an 
increasingly  centralized  and  synchronized  federal  regulatory 
system.  Nevertheless,  the  current  rhetoric  of  advocates  of 
financial  services  industry  reforms  seems  to  have  classically 
liberal pretensions, despite the supervisory and regulatory 
protections  and  subsidies now available  to many  parts  of  that 
industry. 
Competition within a given class of firms (e.g.,  banks) for 
.dominance in  their  market  segment  has  become  transformed  into 
competition across industry sector lines (e.g.,  between banks and 
securities  firms)  for  dominance  largely  determined  by 
governmentally  provided  protections  and  subsidies.  Rhetorical 
consistency and sound strategy for reform would appear to require 
reductions  of  these  protections  and  subsidies,  renewed  and 
increased competition within industry sectors  (not just between 
different  classes of  protected  and  subsidized  industries), and 
increased levels of manager and shareholder  accountability for the 
conduct of their financial institutions. 
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This paper summarizes both the history of financial services 
regulation in the  United  States and  the  conflicting models  of 
political economy, or the legal framework, that lay behind that 
history.  The  principal  supervisory  intervention  and  closure 
options available to financial services regulators by  the  late 
1980s are described briefly.  Many of those options were modified 
or even  extended by  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA),l/  but numerous older supervisory 
tools that  had  fallen into disuse after the  advent  of  federal 
deposit insurance and direct federal intervention in the capital 
markets affecting financial services institutions  during the 1930s 
remain neglected. 
The primary  purpose  of  this paper  is to review the  legal 
framework for the supervision and regulation of financial services 
both  as  it  has  been  and  as  it  might  be.  Specific  policy 
recommendations  regarding  expansion  of the activities of one set of 
financial  institutions across  industrial sector lines  into the 
domains  of  other  financial  institutions,  or  innovations  in 
financial  services supervision,  are beyond the scope of  --this  paper. 
11.  A Brief History of Financial Services Regulation 
in the United States 
It is  .a  common misconception that banks and trust companies, 
bank  holding  companies,  thrift  institutions,  credit  unions, 
securities firms,  insurance companies,  mutual funds,  and the like, 
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companies,  "  have  existed  in  more  or  less  their  present  form 
throughout U.S. history or, even earlier, in British history.2/ 
But the present common  legal form of large banking organizations in 
the United States, a bank holding company with many banking and 
nonbanking subsidiary corporations, was rare in the 19th century 
and became the generally accepted model only after World War 11. 
The most frequently advocated alternative model for large banks, a 
universal bank with branches nationwide, has never existed in the 
United States,  and the closest approximations,  the First and Second 
Banks of the United States,  were so limited in their asset powers 
that they could not properly be called universal banks.3/  Even in 
Great Britain, the model  of  the universal bank  with nationwide 
branches  has  come  into  existence  only  since  enactment  of  the 
Financial Services Act of 1986.4/ 
Prior to  enactment  of  the  National  Bank  Act  (1863), most 
American banks did not have corporate charters, and even those 
that  did  still exposed their shareholders to double liability. 
Shareholders were liable to the bank regulator for assessments up 
to the par value of their shares,,  then a substantial amount,  if the 
bank's  assets  were  insufficient  to  satisfy  liability  holders' 
claims.  Thus,  there was a fair amount of personal liability  on the 
part of directors and ordinary shareholders if their institutions 
failed.  Also, before the National Bank Act, most bank charters 
were issued only for limited terms--20  years was the most common. 
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having as their principal liabilities deposit accounts instead of 
circulating notes were a novelty of the second half of the 19th 
century in the United States.  The National Bank Act  authorized 
"national  associations"  to obtain federal  banking licenses  in  order 
to enable partnership and sole-proprietorship  banks to join the 
bond-secured  currency scheme,  and state law  also licensed banks but 
did not require them to incorporate. 
Neither the Federal Reserve Act (1913)  nor the Banking  Acts of 
1933 and 1935 required member banks to incorporate,  and the double 
liability  of national bankst  shareholders  was not eliminated until 
the Banking Act of 1935.  Instead, the impetus for incorporation 
was  provided by the Emergency Banking  Act of 1933,  which authorized 
the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  (RFC)  to  assist  the 
'reorganization  of  troubled banks  by  purchasing  their preferred 
shares  (it  was  easier  to  obtain  the  RFCts assistance  for 
incorporated banks).  Private banks holding  commercial bank  or 
trust company licenses still exist under New York state law:  Brown 
Brothers Harriman is one example, and even J.P. Morgan &  Co. did 
not become a publicly traded corporation until the 1950s. 
Investment companies, securities broker-dealers, investment 
banks, mutual funds,  mutual thrift institutions,  mutual insurance 
companies,  and the like are not required to incorporate as a matter 
of  law.  It  is possible to derive from this description of  the 
prior  legal  framework the  hypothesis  that  it  was  the  personal 
liability of the principals of unincorporated financial services 
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firms,  and that it was governmental incentives like the prospect of 
RFC assistance that tempted those principals to incorporate (see 
analogous arguments in  Kane  [1987], pp.  104-105, and  A.  Smith 
[1976],  book 11,  pp. 329-337). 
More than just banks alone, financial services corporations 
were generally considered to create moral and legal difficulties 
that ordinary business corporations did not  because, before the 
Free Banking Era  (1838-1861),  they depended on the favor of the 
state for their corporate charters and  continued profitability. 
Adam Smith  (1976)  wrote disparagingly of the joint-stock trading 
companies of his day; the framers of the Constitution noted the 
American  prejudices  against  corporations  of  any  type,  but 
especially against "monied  corporations,"  and failed to include an 
incorporations clause in the Constitution;  Andrew Jackson opposed 
banks primarily because  they promoted  the  circulation of  paper 
money;  late  19th  and  early  20th  century  political  rhetoric 
denounced  the "money  trust"  ;  New York attorney Charles Evans Hughes  - 
became famous as legislative counsel investigating the misdeeds of 
insurance companies in 1905;  and as late as 1913-14,  Louis Brandeis 
wrote a series of  articles  (later compiled into a book) on the 
economic  inefficiencies of  large holding companies of  the J.P. 
Morgan model,  entitled Other People's Monev and How the Bankers Use 
It.5/  Both Hughes and Brandeis later became justices of the U.S.  - 
Supreme Court. 
Abundant arguments existed on the other side, to be  sure: 
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charter for  the First Bank of the United States; Chief Justice John 
Marshall sustained the constitutionality of the federal corporate 
charter of  the Second Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. 
Maryland  (4 Wheaton  [17 U.S.1  316  [1819]); a  whole  system of 
federally chartered national banking associations  was established 
under the National Bank Act;  and incorporated Federal Reserve Banks 
were  established  nationwide  under  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of 
1913.6/  Financial  services  companies  could  and  did  exist  in 
corporate  form and  even  with  federal charters, but  the  older, 
Jeffersonian,  Madisonian,  and Jacksonian  notions of minimal federal 
interference  in  state  regulation  of  financial  services  has 
prevailed to.  the extent that the chartering, licensing, and most 
forms  of  supervision  of  nonbank  financial  firms  remain  the 
exclusive domain of state law.7/ 
Reforms  of the 1930s  changed the legal framework for financial 
services  significantly,  but  banks  and,  later,  bank  holding 
companies  were more directly affected  by federal centralization  and 
regulation than were nonbank financial firms.  For the most part, 
the latter were allowed to continue operating under2--state  law, 
becoming  subject  only  to  federal registration  and  information 
disclosure  laws  in  the  1930s  and  federal  consumer protection 
legislation in the 1960s and 1970s.  Federal deposit insurance was 
created  in  1933  and  was  made  available  to  state-chartered, 
nonmember banks as well as to Federal Reserve member banks, then 
considered a political triumph for  proponents of state banking.  A 
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part of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 (Wyatt 119331  ) , but that 
effort was abandoned in favor of the de facto nationalization of 
both financial and nonfinancial firms' capital structures between 
1932 and 1947  under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation  Act  (see 
Todd  [1992]).  Bank branching activities,  which became restricted 
in  the  early  1900s, were  liberalized  in  1927  but  retrenched 
somewhat in 1933,  and branch banking did not expand significantly 
again until the 1960s.  Bank holding company expansion became a 
device for evading restrictive branch banking laws in the 1920s, 
but was retrenched between the 1930s and the early postwar years. 
The Bank Holding Company  Act of 1956,  its 1966 and 1970 amendments, 
and  the  International Banking Act  of  1978  (for foreign banks) 
imposed federal restrictions on bank holding company and foreign 
bank expansion that have made the creation of nationwide branch or 
subsidiary banking networks legally and practically impossible, 
although the advent  of  automated teller machines has tended to 
undermine these restrictions. 
On the whole, prior to the  1980s, the legal framework for 
financial services regulation in the United States was constructed 
roughly as follows: 
Banks and bank holding companies  were regulated  primarily at 
the  federal  level,  but  limited  chartering  .and  supervisory 
responsibilities were retained at the state level. 
After the 1960s,  a gradual trend emerged pursuant to which 
investment banks,  securities broker-dealers, and  mutual  thrift 
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retained their general independence from federal regulation other 
than the registration and disclosure type of requirements. 
Since the 1970s, it has generally been presumed in banking 
reform circles that financial services companies should be allowed 
to engage in all activities not specifically prohibited.  Efforts 
to have federal bank  regulators expand the range of permissible 
activities by administrative interpretation have tended to reflect 
that presumption.  But the long-standing  prior view under American 
and British law was that only activities specifically  authorized or 
"so  closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as 
to be  a proper incident thereto" should be permitted for member 
banks and bank holding companies.8/  In other words, the governing 
assumptions  regarding  the  appropriate boundaries  of  the  legal 
.framework  for financial services have changed within the last 20 
years or  so, but  the  reasons  for  that  change  remain  somewhat 
unclear.  In  any  case,  the  implementation  of  the  altered 
assumptions  through  administrative  decisions  has had uneven success 
in the courts.9/ 
a  Some authorities maintain that there is a type bf  "natural 
market  segmentation" or  compartmentalization  in  the  financial 
services industry, to which a legal structure eventually returns, 
with commercial banks  specializing in short-term loans to  fund 
industrial,  agricultural,  and  retail  enterprises;  thrift 
institutions  specializing  in  home  mortgage  finance; insurance 
companies  sticking  closely  to  core  insurance  and  annuity 
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medium-  and  longer-term credit  requirements  of  commercial  and 
industrial  enterprises.  Such  segmented  or  compartmentalized 
systems have appeared, in fact, in America periodically from the 
time of Alexander Hamilton to the present moment, but most modern 
proponents of banking reform in academic circles have advocated 
reduction or elimination  of geographic and activities restrictions 
on financial  services companies.lO/  Intra-industry and  intra- 
regional consolidation tends to reduce the  competition that  is 
presumed in a free market, but  the modern proponents of  banking 
reform apparently prefer to have  different industry  sectors  compete 
against each other to restore competitive balance.  It is unclear 
how  well  grounded  in  historical  analysis  the  current  reform 
proposals  are,  but  advocates  of  sectoral  segmentation  and 
compartmentalization usually base  their arguments on historical 
analyses that, of course, the opponents contest.ll/ 
111.  Conflicting Models of Political Economy 
Before  drawing  hard  and  fast  conclusions  about  the 
.-.  appropriateness  of  different  approaches  to  financia1'-  services 
reform, it  is useful to review the .principal  attributes of  the 
competing models of political economy that might be relevant.  In 
the  United  States, socialist  models  have  been  disfavored, but 
strong centrally  planned models like corporatism occasionally have 
been accepted in governing circles,  during the First New Deal, for 
example  (Phillips [19921).  Classical liberal or negative liberty 
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operation  of free  markets under the Rule of Law (see  Hayek [I9441  ) . 
Such  free markets  are usually characterized by  the  absence of 
protectionism  (no artificial barriers  to market  entry) and  the 
absence of subsidy, which might be negative  (as  with supervisory 
forbearance,  for  example;  see  Woodward [I9921  ) .  But utilitarian  or 
positive  liberty  models,  with  attributes  preferring  limited 
governmental  intervention  or  regulation  in  the  operations  of 
markets to correct for perceived "market  failures,"  have adherents 
whose  views  might  be  described  as  the  dominant  world  view  in 
Washington since the  1930s.  One way  of  explaining the  1930s' 
financial services reforms is as the product of a struggle between 
Brandeis antitrust liberals (utilitarians)  and central planners of 
the left corporatist type  (e.g.,  Rexford G. Tugwell and,  perhaps, 
A.A. Berle)  (see  Phillips [1992],  pp. 62-67  and Olson [1988], pp. 
111-114)  . 
In general, it was the classical liberals who  lost out in 
those 1930s' policy debates.l2/  Thus, classical liberals need to 
think carefully before defending 1930s' policy reforms. 
Similarly, those whose reference points are earlier, the era 
of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, for example, should 
bear  in mind  comparable distinctions as  to appropriate models. 
Hamilton  was  essentially  a  positive  liberty  thinker,  while 
Jefferson's  and, to  a  slightly lesser degree, Madison's  ideas 
reflect negative  liberty values.  Utilitarian  and  corporatist 
methods often are inconsistent with classical liberal models--a 
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and regulatory structures described below. 
IV.  Regulatory Intervention and Closure Options in the 1980s 
Banks, bank holding companies, and thrift institutions were 
subject to the supervisory and regulatory intervention and closure 
procedures  described  below  during  the  1980s.  Some  of  these 
procedures  evolved from specific supervisory  experiences  during the 
1960s and 1970s,  such as limitations on standby letters of credit 
(1974),  but most were derived from statutory changes in the 1930s 
or even from long-standing  banking customs.  Not until enactment of 
the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA)  for the thrift 
industry  and  the  Financial  Institutions  Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)  for  federally insured institutions 
generally  was there a statutory shift away from the long-term  trend 
toward relaxation of examination and capital ratio standards,  the 
low point of which was the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982.  Garn-St 
Germain was perceived as having created perverse incentives for 
insured institutions,  and CEBA and FIRREA generally were viewed as 
attempts  to  rein in  some of  the  excesses  attributed---to  those 
incentives  (see  generally  Kane  [I9891  and  Mayer  [I9921  ) . 
Basically, FIRREA was  an attempt  to  reintegrate the  legal and 
economic rationales for supervisory intervention, and FDICIA has 
carried that attempt somewhat further. 
Most  of  the  enforcement  tools  needed  by  supervisors  and 
regulators already existed before FDICIA was enacted in 1991.  The 
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intervene  in  the  affairs  of  banks  and  bank  holding  companies 
ordinarily were limited to such institutions  in  troubled or  failing 
condition  prior to enactment of FDICIA.  Apart from filing  periodic 
call  reports  .  or  submitting  to  supervisory  examinations  or 
inspections,  most banks and bank holding companies had, and after 
FDICIA  still  have,  uncontentious  relationships  with  their 
supervisors  and  regulators.  Most  banks  are  not  required  to 
restructure their liabilities in ways that affect the legal rights 
or financial returns of depositors and other claimants.  This  part 
of  the  paper  ignores  issues  regarding  the  supervision  and 
regulation of institutions that would be classified as adequately 
or  well capitalized  under FDICIA1s  standards  and focuses instead  on 
the supervisory  regime for troubled and failing institutions  before 
-FDICIA.  The next part  of the paper focuses on changes to that 
regime made by FDICIA. 
Enforcement Actions 
The three principal federal bank supervisory and regulatory 
agencies (hereafter  referred to simply as the Agencies]'  long have 
had at their  disposal a variety of instruments  to redirect a bank's 
affairs.  Possibly the most  significant is the cease-and-desist 
order  .l3/  Section 8  (b)  of the FDIC Act authorizes the Agencies to 
issue such  orders against insured banks and institution-affiliated 
parties.  Bef  ore initiating the action, however, an Agency must 
find that an  unsafe or  unsound practice has occurred,  is occurring, 
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written agreement,  or other  written condition imposed by the  Agency 
has occurred,  is occurring,  or is about to occur.  After making the 
required  findings, an  Agency  must  satisfy  several  procedural 
requirements, including giving notice  to the named parties  and 
providing the opportunity for a hearing, before it may issue an 
order.  Once such an order becomes final, it is enforceable by the 
courts (see  12 U.  S.  C. Section 1818  [i]  [I1  ) .  Violations of a cease- 
and-desist  order may also result in the imposition of civil money 
penalties by the Agencies, which may reach $1 million per day (12 
U.S.  C. Section 1818  [il [21  ) . 
Cease-and-desist  orders are flexible,  multipurpose tools for 
requiring the affected party to take or to stop certain actions or 
to take  certain actions only after Agency  review and  approval. 
They have been used by the Agencies to address a wide variety of 
banking problems, ranging from unsound loan administration to weak 
management and violations of law.  Typical orders might restrict 
the  payment  of  dividends, require  improved  capital  ratios, or  - 
mandate the development of programs to improve earnings.  Since 
1989, the Agencies have been explicitly authorized to require the 
affected parties to take affirmative action to correct conditions 
resulting from the violation of law or from the unsafe or unsound 
practice that caused the order to be issued.l4/ 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmRemoval of Deposit Insurance 
The FDIC may  terminate a bank's  federal deposit  insurance 
pursuant  to  Section  8(a)  of  the  FDI  Act  (12 U.S.C. Section 
1818[a]).  The  statute  generally  provides  that  the  FDIC  may 
initiate  a  proceeding  once  it  determines  that  there  exist 
violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices that require the 
termination of insurance.  Insurance also may be terminated if the 
FDIC determines that  the institution is  in such an unsafe  and 
unsound condition  that it may not continue operations  as an insured 
bank.  Once a final order terminating insurance becomes effective, 
following notice,  hearing,  and appeal, the insured deposits of the 
bank remain insured, less  withdrawals, for a period of at least six 
months  or  for as long as two years, as the FDIC might  decide. 
Additions  to  existing  deposits  and  new  deposits  after  final 
termination  are  not  insured.  In  similar  circumstances under 
Section 8  (a)  ,  the FDIC may  suspend deposit insurance if  it  has 
reason to believe that the insured bank has no tangible capital 
left under the capital  guidelines  or  regulations of the appropriate 
Agency. 
Forfeiture of Bank Charter 
The  Office  of  the  Comptroller of  the  Currency  (OCC) may 
initiate suit in federal court to determine whether directors of a 
national bank have knowingly  violated the National Bank Act or  the 
Federal Reserve Act.  Upon judgment of such  violation, the rights, 
privileges, and franchises of the bank are forfeited.l5/  In such 
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I  bank might be created. 
Conservatorshi~ 
Prior to  FDICIA, the OCC could, without notice or a prior 
hearing,.  appoint  a guardian or caretaker  for a  national  bank, 
called a "conservator,"  whenever the Comptroller determined that 
one or more of  ten conditions listed in .12  U.S.C. Section 203(a) 
and  (c)  existed with respect to that bank.  The conditions listed 
that were most directly relevant to this paper included: 
(i)  The bank is in an unsafe and unsound condition  to transact 
business, including having substantially insufficient 
capital or otherwise, and 
(ii)  The bank has incurred or is likely to incur losses that 
will deplete all or substantially all of its capital,  and 
there is no reasonable  prospect for the bank1  s capital to 
be replenished without federal assistance.l6/ 
Even when the listed conditions  were satisfied,  the language of the  - 
National  Bank  Act  made  it  clear  that  the  appointment  of  a 
conservator by the OCC is discretionary. 
The OCC1s  objectives in appointing a conservator,  who may be 
the FDIC, are to take possession of  the bank  and to take  such 
actions  as  might  be  necessary  to  conserve  its  assets  pending 
disposition of  its business.  The conservator acts with all the 
powers of the bank's  shareholders, officers, and directors, and 
unless the OCC prohibits his doing so, he may continue to operate 
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new deposits and use  them to  satisfy the  claims of  previously 
existing depositors,  which does not necessarily matter much if the 
grounds for his appointment do not  include the bank's  actual or 
prospective insolvency.  However, the capacity to use new deposits 
to  pay  off  old  deposits  is  an  important  (albeit  .economically 
unsustainable)  power if the bank actually is or is likely to become 
insolvent.  (See Appendix  A.)  The  bank  may  challenge  the 
appointment of  a conservator within 20 days  (12 U.S.C.  Section 
203  [b]  [I]  ) ,  but  conservatorship usually continues until the OCC 
(together  with the FDIC, if it has been appointed as conservator) 
decides that the conservatorship may be ended safely and the bank 
either  is permitted  to  resume business or  is sold, merged, or 
liquidated (that is, a receiver is appointed),  etc.l8/ 
Receivership 
Before FDICIA,  the OCC could appoint a receiver for a national 
bank whenever "a£  ter due examination  of its af  f  airs,  he found that 
1) the bank had forfeited  its charter for knowing  violations of the 
National Bank ~ct,  l9/ 2)  a creditor  had obtained a judgment against 
the bank that remained unpaid for at least 30 days, or 3) the bank 
had become insolvent (12  U.  S.  C. Section 191)  .  An additional ground 
for  appointment of a national bank receiver  before 1934  was failure 
to redeem circulating  national bank notes--in  fact, it was on this 
ground that most court cases involving national bank insolvencies 
were  decided  be£  ore  1934,  when  circulating  notes  were 
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been determined by a "maturing  obligationsn  test--that  is,  capacity 
to  meet  maturing  obligations,  rather  than  a  mere  excess  of 
liabilities over assets.  However,  before 1933,  occasionally since 
1933, and again after FDICIA, insolvency has also been determined 
by what amounted to a balance-sheet  test (an  excess of liabilities 
other  than  capital  over  assets, at  book  value).  That  is, a 
national  bank  might  dishonor  maturing  obligations  or  its  own 
circulating notes  (pre-1934),  or  close  its doors  (which often 
happened  during  panics,  when  circulating  notes  could  not  be 
redeemed  in specie), but  the final regulatory determination of 
insolvency, reflecting the condition of the bank's balance sheet, 
among other factors, would be made by the Comptroller.  See Smith 
v. Witherow, 102 F.2d 638 (3d  Cir. 1939). 
It is worth noting that the balance-sheet  test for insolvency 
could rely fairly safely  on  book-value  accounting in the past (pre- 
1933) because national banks then held no long-term assets whose  _ 
market value would have differed significantly  from book value, or 
historic cost. Also, cash accounting  principles were commonly  used 
for banks prior to  1933, which meant  that  divergences in asset 
values due to the lags  of accrual accounting  usually did not exist. 
The general transition to historic-cost  accounting principles for 
banks occurred pursuant to a supervisory agreement in 1938  (see 
Mengle  [I9911 and Simonson and Hempel [1992]). 
Whichever test is applied for the appointment of a national 
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entirely  discretionary  and  cannot  be  compelled by  the  bank's 
creditors, although it may be attacked by the bank itself.  Once 
appointed, the  receiver  (usually the  FDIC  for  insured  banks) 
ordinarily has no mandate other than to take control of the bank's 
assets and af  fairs,  wind up its business, and close the bank  (12 
u.S.C. Sections 191 and 194).  After all creditors have been paid 
in full, the occ (or  the FDIC, if acting as receiver) must call a 
shareholderst meeting  to determine whether  the  receiver, or an 
agent elected  by the shareholders,  should complete  the distribution 
of  receivership assets to shareholders or should further manage 
affairs (12  U.S.C. Section 197). 
Bridqe Banks 
Bridge banks share many common attributes  with and serve  many 
of the same economic objectives as national bank conservatorships. 
The principal difference is that bridge banks are organized and 
administered by  the FDIC, while  the OCC appoints national bank 
I 
I  conservators.  In  effect,  the bridge bank power enables the FDIC to 
take over failing banks even though the FDIC is not a charter- 
issuing agency. 
Bridge  banks  were  authorized  under  Section  503  of  CEBA 
(1987)  (now 12 U.S.C. Section 1821  [n]  ) .  Previously, in states 
without conservatorship  statutes,  there was no orderly way for the 
FDIC to encourage state regulators to close state-chartered  banks 
while assuring those regulators that the banking operations of the 
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establishing  political  support  for  the  closure.  The  CEBA 
provisions regarding bridge banks required actual closing of  an 
insured bank before a bridge bank could be chartered to continue 
its operations (former  12 U.S.C. Section 1821  [il [ll  ) . 
FIRREA (1989) amended the bridge bank provisions of the FDI 
Act  to authorize the chartering of a bridge bank whenever it  is 
determined  by a court,  the appropriate administrative body, or the 
appropriate  Agency that one or  more insured depository institutions 
are either "in  defaultt1  (that  is,  a conservator,  receiver,  or other 
legal custodian is actually appointed) or "in  danger of default" 
(that is, it  is determined either that  the insured institution 
cannot  meet  maturing  demands  or  obligations  without  federal 
assistance  or  that  the  insured  institution has  incurred or is 
likely to incur losses that would substantially  deplete all of its 
capital without federal assistance)  .21/  Thus, the creation of a 
bridge bank no longer need await a chartering authority's  formal 
closing order and becomes largely discretionary on the part of the 
FDIC. 
After  the  FDIC's  board  of  directors  autho~izes the 
organization of a bridge bank, the OCC must charter it  (12  U.S.C. 
Section 1821 [nl [ll [A1  .  A bridge bank is deemed a new, insured 
national bank from the time it is chartered, "in  defaultn  for the 
purpose of abridging certain contractual obligations of the former 
depository  institution, operating  without  capital, and not  an 
agency,  establishment,  or  instrumentality  of  the  U.S. 
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directors  must  determine  that  at  least  one  of  the  following 
conditions exists: 
(i)  The costs of operating the bridge bank would not exceed 
the costs to the FDIC of liquidation; 
(ii) The continued operation of an insured bank is essential 
to provide adequate banking services in the community; 
or 
(iii)  The continued operation of the former bank is in the 
best interest of its depositors (12  U.S.C. Section 1821 
[nl [21 [A1  . 
A  bridge  bank  may  assume  only  the  deposits  and  other 
liabilities and purchase only the assets of the defaulting insured 
bank that the FDIC determines to be appropriate.23/  A bridge bank 
generally can  exercise all the corporate  powers of a  national  bank, 
without  having  to  observe  national  banks'  capital  adequacy 
? 
requirements.  Its existence is limited to two years,  but this may 
be extended by the FDIC for up to three additional one-year  periods 
(12  U.S.C.  Section 1821 [nl [41  and [91  1.  The statute anticipates 
that any bridge bank will be merged,.  sold,  or otherwise disposed of 
during its existence  (12 U.S.C. Section 1821  [n]  [lo']  - [Ill  ) .  If 
not, the FDIC is to dissolve it and commence liquidation,  with the 
OCC  appointing  the  FDIC  as  receiver  (12 U.S.C.  Section  1821 
[n]  [I21  ) .  Hortative language in the statute  (12 U.S.C. Section 
1821 [n]  [3]  [B])  apparently contemplates  that existing  borrowers  and 
depositors continue to be accommodated. 
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FDICIA  changed  the  supervisory  intervention  and  closure 
regimes described above only minimally, but  added a new set of 
intervention  powers:  capital-based prompt  corrective  action 
(Sections  131-133 of FDICIA)  , designed to impose  a supervisory  duty 
to avoid or minimize  loss to the deposit  insurance funds and, 
ultimately,  to the taxpayer. Under prompt corrective action,  there 
is essentially an increasing degree of supervisory intervention  in 
an insured institution's  affairs as the  leverage capital ratio 
(capital  vs. total assets) or  the risk-based  capital ratio (capital 
vs. risk-adjusted  or weighted assets) declines. 
Five  capital  ranges  are  established  for  open  depository 
institutions,  ranging  from  well-capitalized  to  critically 
undercapitalized.  The  Agencies  are  authorized  to  define  the 
capital  adequacy ratios for those ranges.  Only  the  first two 
ranges  (well-capitalized and  adequately  capitalized)  may  be 
exempted  from  prompt  corrective  action  as  capital  adequacy 
declines.  Once capital reaches the critically undercapitalized  - 
level, currently defined as a Tier 1 leverage capital ratio of 2 
percent or less, the institution must be closed within 90 days, 
unless the  Agency grants an extension that can  be renewed only once 
(conservatorships  and bridge banks are exempted from this rule). 
While Agency discretion  played an important role in the pre-FDICIA 
supervisory regimes, that discretion has been severely limited by 
the prompt corrective action provisions in order to mandate the 
abandonment of supervisory  forbearance  by the  Agencies.  Rightly or 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmwrongly, Congress believed that  it  was  forbearance that  either 
caused or increased the losses incurred by  the Resolution Trust 
Corporation and the Bank Insurance Fund during the 1980s.24/ 
Other relevant changes made by FDICIA include: 
Enforcement Actions.  The criteria for issuance of cease-and- 
desist  orders  were  amended  by  adding  the  receipt  in  an 
institution'  s most  recent report of examination of a less-than- 
satisfactory rating for asset quality, management, earnings, or 
liquidity.  If  the deficiency goes uncorrected, the appropriate 
Agency may  deem  the continuance of the deficiency an unsafe or 
unsound banking practice (12  U.S.C.  Section 1818 [bl [8]). 
Conservatorshi~.  The  standards  for  appointment  of 
conservators  of  national  banks  were  unified  with  those  for 
appointment of the FDIC as conservator of insured state-chartered 
depository institutions (12  U.S.C.  Section 1821 [c]  [5], effective 
December 19, 1992)  .  The principal new feature of these revised 
standards  is the explicit authorization of a balance-sheet  test (an 
excess of liabilities over assets) as grounds for appointment of a 
conservator, as distinguished from the mere inability to satisfy 
claims as they mature. 
receivers hi^.  The receivership section of the National Bank 
Act  (12  U.S.C. Section 191) was modified, effective December 19, 
1992, to provide for the appointment of the FDIC as receiver of 
national banks without ~rior  notice or  hearinss on the same unified 
grounds  as  for  the  appointment  of  the  FDIC  as  conservator, 
including  the  explicit  authorization  of  a  balance-sheet test. 
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has fewer than five directors.  No prior examination is required 
for the OCC to be authorized to appoint a receiver. 
*  * 
FDICIA  made  no  other  substantive  changes  in  the  bank 
supervisory intervention  and closure  regime.  Of all these changes, 
it  is reasonable to predict that the  capital-based intervention 
standards and  the procedures for prompt  corrective action will 
prove to be the most far-reaching.  FDICIA also contains language 
aimed  at  encouraging  studies  of  market-value  accounting  and 
limiting the use of the Federal Reserve Banks1 discount windows, 
but the risk-adjusted FDIC assessments probably will prove to be 
the most significant supervisory  change other than the supervisory 
interventions  foreseen  under  prompt corrective action.  In  general, 
it is fair to characterize FDICIA as a market-oriented  attempt to 
realign the legal and economic incentives underlying supervisors' 
and bankers' behavior in the same taxpayer-cost-reducing  direction 
and away from forbearance.25/ 
VI.  After FDICIA:  The Evolving Legal Agenda 
The enactment of FDICIA essentially reflected congressional 
frustration  and  disappointment  regarding  the  performance  of 
depository institutions' supervisors  and regulators over the prior 
decade.  Only the national credit union industry,  among depository 
institutions,  has managed to avoid  (thus far) the same degree of 
congressional scrutiny and mandate for supervisory intervention. 
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in that industry, albeit unlikely, also would give rise to FDICIA- 
like legislation. 
Insurance companies remain almost entirely regulated by  the 
states, but it is conceivable that high-profile  failures of large 
insurers  would generate  enough  political pressure to  cause Congress 
to  attempt  to  mandate  uniform  nationwide  supervision.  Under 
existing economic conditions, however, very  few, if  any, large 
insurance companies are  likely  to fail.  In early  1993, press 
reports indicated that Representative Joseph Kennedy 2d (D.-Mass.) 
had introduced  a bill to require insurance companies  to comply with 
federal standards  analogous  to those for  banks regarding disclosure 
of data on racial and demographic characteristics  of customers,  an 
anti-redlining  measure.  It  appeared  that  the  Kennedy  bill 
contemplated  offering  increased  access  to  the  Federal  Reserve 
Banks1 discount windows in exchange for compliance with federal 
anti-redlining standards (Garsson [I9931  ) . 
Securities firms and  investment banks  also  continue to be 
chartered under state, not federal, law.  Federal supervision of 
the securities industry, however, has been a fact of l-ife  since 
1933,  though state supervision  continues to play an important role 
with respect to small companies, securities issues not registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the like.  It is 
conceivable that  a  few high-profile failures in the securities 
industry might  trigger a congressional movement toward uniform, 
federal supervision.  Mutual funds  essentially are subject to the 
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firms and investment banks, but they currently experience a fairly 
high degree of federal supervision. 
Comparatively few new  powers  are  likely  to  be  granted  to 
federally insured depository institutions, given the prevailing 
mood in Congress.  Interstate branching opportunities might arrive 
soon  for  well-capitalized  banks,  but  increased  insurance 
underwriting powers seem unlikely.  It  is fair to  state that, 
currently, there  is  some  support  in  Congress  for  regulatory 
relaxation tied  to  relief  of  the  "credit crunchI1'  but  little 
support for wholesale expansion of banks into new business lines. 
The  rising  importance of  mutual  funds  seems to  make  them 
outstanding candidates for the next  round of  increased federal 
regulation of financial services companies.  In my opinion, such 
.increased  regulation is unnecessary and would be unwise because of 
the  implicit guarantee that  federal  supervision and  regulation 
might carry for mutual fund activities. 
For  the  103rd  Congress,  at  least,  it  appears  that  the  - 
principal  legal  agenda  items  regarding  financial  services are 
..- 
reform  and  restructuring  proposals ' covering  the  federal  bank 
supervisory authorities.  Regarding  the  Federal Reserve, bills 
introduced in both houses of  congre'ss  during January 1993 would 
tend  to.  centralize  control  in  Washington  of  monetary  policy 
deliberations  that have been left until now in the hands of Reserve 
Bank presidents,  whose selection  is  largely  determined by directors 
elected by private-sector  member banks.26/ 
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the  supervisory functions of  the Agencies.  Under the  Gonzalez 
plan, a new Federal Banking Commission would  be  created as an 
independent regulator,  and all supervisory responsibilities of the 
Agencies (except  the National Credit Union  Administration,  or  NCUA) 
would be transf  erred to it.  27/  Under the Leach plan, a new Federal 
Banking Agency would be created as an independent regulator, with 
the OCC and the Off  ice of Thrift Supervision combined into it.  The 
new Agency would acquire jurisdiction over bank holding companies 
with federally insured subsidiaries  whose assets are less than $25 
billion and whose principal subsidiary is a federally chartered 
depository institution, together with all stand-alone federally 
chartered banks and thrift institutions.  The FDIC would be  the 
federal  supervisor  for  stand-alone  state-chartered banks  and 
thrifts as well as for bank and savings and loan holding companies 
with assets less than $25 billion and whose principal subsidiary  is 
a  state-chartered institution.  The  NCUAts jurisdiction would 
remain unaffected.  Thus,  the Federal Reserve would be left as the 
principal supervisor of bank holding companies with insured banks 
as their principal depository institution subsidiaries and with 
total  assets in excess of  $25 billion.  The Federal Reserve's 
supervisory jurisdiction would  extend to all  such bank  holding 
companies' subsidiaries, regardless of  the type of charter held. 
The Fed would  also be the principal supervisor for all  foreign 
banking activities and for U.S. activities of foreign banks with 
worldwide assets in excess of $25 billion.28/ 
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useful  when  analyzing  them  to  bear  in  mind  the  principles 
articulated above regarding  competing models of political economy. 
For example, if we intend to achieve classically liberal results 
(market-determined  outcomes) consistent with a  least-government 
model, it might make more sense to leave the regulation and subsidy 
of insurance companies at the state, not the federal, level.  In 
matters affecting the expansion of banks' powers, it might prove 
helpful to consider whether German universal banking models, for 
example, have anything useful to communicate to U.S.  policymakers 
if  the policymakers really intend to follow a classical liberal 
model of banking structure and regulation in the long run.  It just 
might be the case that German-style  universal banking works as it 
does because of a radically different set of accumulated customs, 
.laws, and  assumptions about  the  optimal  method  for organizing 
society than the set that  has.  applied in the United States.29/ 
After all, one of Hayek's  points in The Fatal Conceit  (1988) is 
that the evolution of the structure of markets and institutions in  - 
capitalist societies  is not independent of the societies' moral and 
ethical codes.  If that proposition is true, then it ought to be 
necessary to change the German universal banking model to fit U.S. 
society,  or to change  U.S. society toward Germanic norms, if we set 
about to accommodate German-style  universal banking.30/ 
If  the  optimal  structure for the  central bank  or for the 
Agencies  (federal  bank supervisors) becomes the principal agenda 
item after FDICIA, it would be useful to apply the same principles 
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centralize monetary  policy  or  supervisory powers  in Washington 
might be consistent  with centrally  planned political economy  models 
and with some varieties of utilitarianism, even though at  first 
glance this would seem to be repugnant to classically liberal or 
mildly utilitarian principles.  It is unclear that a rhetoric of 
free markets and free trade could be easily reconciled with the 
practice of strongly  utilitarian  or central  planning methods in any 
logically rigorous way.31/ 
VII.  Conclusion 
The legal and theoretical history of  financial institution 
structure in the United States carries an ambiguous message for 
present-day  policymakers trying to devise an optimal framework for 
financial  services.  At  the  inception, the  dominant  political 
economy  model was classically liberal,  but strong  policymakers like 
Alexander Hamilton and, later, Nicholas Biddle strove constantly 
and with increasing success to introduce utilitarian attributes 
into that  framework.  A  central bank  was  created, barriers to 
perpetual  corporate  charters for  financial  institutions became 
eroded, double  liability  for shareholders was  dropped, federal 
deposit  insurance  was  introduced, and  what  appears  to  be  an 
inexorable  tendency  toward  centralization  of  supervision  in 
Washington has developed. 
The  recent  policy  debate has  been  dominated  by  questions 
regarding  supervisorsJ powers  to  intervene, while  the  better 
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a structure that reduced the role of federal supervisors and left 
a  greater  role  for  the  states  and  for  market  discipline  of 
financial  institutions.  If  our  methods  and  methodologies 
increasingly  become strongly utilitarian or mildly corporatist,  it 
is  fair  to  ask  whether  it  is  logically  correct  or  morally 
responsible to continue  to use  free-market (classical liberal) 
rhetoric to describe what we do.  I would prefer to dismantle the 
structures that ensure increasing levels of centralization of the 
financial  services supervisory  framework  and  to  return  to  the 
original, classical liberal model.  Dismantling federal deposit 
insurance,  separating  solvency-support  (capital-replacement) 
lending from the  central bank  and placing  it  on-budget at  the 
Treasury,  and restoring increased levels  of manager and shareholder 
accountability for the  conduct of  their  financial institutions 
would seem to be useful places to begin this process. 
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1.  FDICIA,  enacted December 19,  1991,  is Public Law No. 102- 
242. 
2.  Other nations1  histories either are or have been somewhat 
relevant to  (and are  often cited  as possible models  for) the 
restructuring  of  American  legal  and  financial  services 
institutions.  Although those histories are interesting and often 
instructive, the hard  fact remains that, as a matter  of  legal 
history, only the English and Scottish experiences are directly 
relevant to the actual evolution of the framework forthe  American 
financial services industry.  The  future, of  course, might  be 
different,  but  the  past  is  less  mutable  on  this  point  than 
proponents of universal banking or expanded governmental subsidies 
of the financial services industry might wish to acknowledge. 
For detailed analysis of this issue, see Roe (1993). 
3.  Useful summary  descriptions  of the legal structures  of the 
First and Second Banks of the United States appear in Judge Harold 
Greene's  supplemental opinion in Melcher v. Federal ODen Market 
Committee,  644  F.Supp.  510  (District  Court  D.C.  1986). 
Subsequently,  Melcher was affirmed on other srounds, 836 F.2d 561 
(D.C.  Cir. 1987)  ; certiorari denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988)  . 
4.  Good  descriptions  of  the  legal  forms  and  structural 
organizations found among large banks in early American history 
appear  in  Hammond  (1957) and  Gibbons  (1859)  .  A  comparable 
description for Britain, especially for Scotland, is in L. White 
(1984)  , pp. 23-49. 
5.  See A. Smith  (19761, book V,  chapter 1, pp.  245-282; 
Tansill (1965),  pp. 563, 724-725;  Schlesinger (1945),  pp. 76-77; 
Mowry  (1958),  p. 79; and Brandeis (1914)~  esp. pp. 135-223. 
6.  See Hamilton (1790,  1791); Hart  (1899)~  pp. 230-252,  274- 
288; and Smith and Beasley  (1972),  pp. 90-94. 
7.  See Jefferson (1791);  Madison  (1791);  James (-1938),  pp. 
556-558;  and Schlesinger (1945)~  pp. 76-77. 
8.  This phraseology appears in Section 4  (c)  (8)  of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended  (12  U.S.C. Section 1843). 
9.  See,  for  example,  Board  of  Governors  v.  Dimension 
Financial Corporation, 474 U.S. 361 (1986)  ,  in which the Supreme 
Court  decided,  8-0, that  the  Board  lacked  the  authority  to 
reinterpret  the  statutory definitions of  terms  like  !!banku  or 
lfcommercial  loanff  in Section 2  (c)  of the -Bank  Holding Company Act 
(12  U.S.C. Section 1841) so as to extend the Board's  regulatory 
authority to nonbank banks.  Such banks generally remain outside 
Federal Reserve regulation unless they are owned or controlled by 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmbanks or bank holding companies.  On the other hand, most of the 
Board's orders liberalizing securities  powers of the affiliates of 
member banks, reversing prior, limited interpretations of Section 
20  of  the  Banking  Act  of  1933  (12 U.S.C. Section  377), have 
withstood court challenges since the early 1980s. 
10.  The idea of  "natural market segmentationu is discussed 
favorably  by, among  others,  Stevens (1898),  p. 264,  and,  nearly 100 
years later, Minsky (1993),  who in turn credits Kregel  (1992)  for 
this idea.  On the other hand, the idea of dismantling segmented or 
compartmentalized  financial  services  institutions  is  discussed 
favorably by, among others, England  (1993),  Kaufman  (1993), and 
U.S.  Treasury (1991). 
11.  The  best-known  historical  analyses  in  favor  of 
segmentation and  compartmentalization of  financial services are 
Brandeis (1914)  and Pecora  (1939).  Among the better-known recent 
critiques  of those analyses are E. White (1986)  and Benston (1990)  . 
For  a  good  current  restatement  of  the  recent  critiques,  see 
Wheelock  (1993)  . 
12.  Herbert Hoover and  Carter Glass were, I suppose, the 
leading illustrations of this proposition.  See generally Hoover 
(1952)  and Smith and Beasley (1972)  . 
13.  Other  similar  enforcement  actions  employed  by  the 
Agencies  are  the  written  agreement  and  the  memorandum  of 
understanding.  Like  the  cease-and-desist order,  the  written 
agreement  is a  formal  supervisory  action.  The  memorandum  of 
understanding,  however, is informal. The  Agencies,  with respect to 
commercial  banks,  are  the  Federal  Reserve, the  Office  of  the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC. 
14.  12 U.S.C.  Section 1818  (b)  (6)  .  This section specifically 
lists  the  following types  of  affirmative action  that  affected  - 
institutions may be required to take:  1) restitution for certain 
losses, 2) restrictions on asset growth,  3) disposal of any loan  or 
other  asset, 4) rescission of  agreements or contracts, and  5) 
employment of qualified officers and employees who may-be  subject 
to approval by the Agency.  It should be self-evident  that not all 
onerous banking regulations proceeded from FDICIA alone. 
15.  12 U.S  .C. Sections  93  (a) and  501  (a)  .  Directors  of 
national banks may be personally liable for damages caused to the 
banks or to others because of their consensual violations of the 
National Bank Act or the Federal Reserve Act. 
16.  12  U.S.C. Section 203 was completely rewritten by FIRREA 
in 1989.  The general counsel of the Federal Reserve Board, Walter 
Wyatt,  drafted  the  original  Bank  Conservation Act  (12 U.  S  .  C  . 
Sections 201-211)  as Title I1 of the Emergency  Banking Act of March 
9,  1933.  (Federal  Reserve ~ulletin,  vol. 19  [1933],  p. 115.  See 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmalso,  Jones  [19511, pp.  21-22.)  The  former  condition  for 
appointment of a conservator under Wyatt's version of Section 203 
was  "whenever  [the OCCI  shall  deem  it  necessary  in  order  to 
conserve the assets of any bank for the benefit of the depositors 
and other creditors thereof. .  .  .  "  In other words, no explicit 
finding  of actual or potential insolvency was required,  but former 
Section 203 provided explicitly that a conservator  was to have all 
the  powers  of  a  receiver,  in  addition  to powers  necessary  to 
operate the  bank.  Jones  (1951), p.  22, notes  that  the  title 
tlconservator"  was "akin  to receiver but  less harsh on the public 
ear."  The original object of  conservatorship "was to stave off 
creditors long enough to rehabilitate a bank rather than let it go 
into receivership.  "  (Ibid.  ) 
17.  12 U.S.C. Section 206, as amended in 1989 by  FIRREA. 
Previously, Section 203 provided that a conservator had all the 
rights and powers of a receiver and that the rights of all parties 
with respect to a conservator were "the  same as if a receiver had 
been  appointed,  which  limited  the  conservator1  s  capacity  to 
maintain uninterrupted banking services  (for example, claimants 
against conservatorships could not have obtained full satisfaction 
of their claims--to  the possible prejudice of  other claimants-- 
without  judicial  approval)  .  Now,  a  judicial  order  might  be 
necessary to  prevent the conservator from satisfying some claims in 
full, to the potential detriment of other claimants. 
18.  12 U.S.C. Section 205.  Former Section 205 provided for 
termination  (other than  by  "reorganizationM  under  Section  207 
.  [repealed in 19891  or conversion into receivership) whenever the 
OCC decided that it could safely be done and would be in the public 
interest. 
19.  The  knowing  violations  of  the  National  Bank  Act 
prohibited under 12 U.S.C.  Section 93 were not amended by Title IX 
of FIRREA,  which established civil money penalties for violations 
of the Act.  Those knowing violations include the acceptance of 
deposits after  the  commission of  an act  of  insolvency, or  in 
contemplation of  such  an  act.  12  U.S.C. Section  91.  This 
prohibition against the acceptance  'of  new deposits while knowingly 
insolvent was enforced frequently  until 1934 (when  federal deposit 
insurance commenced),  but has been enforced only rarely since then 
and not, to the author's knowledge,  within the last 20 years. 
20.  See 12 U.S.C. Section 192 and cases cited thereunder. 
Many lawyers are deceived by  looking only under Section 191 for 
cases involving insolvent national banks. 
21.  FIRREA Sections 204 and 214; 12 U.S.C. Sections 1813(x) 
and 1821  (n)  .  These criteria are essentially the same as those for 
appointment of a receiver  or  conservator  of a national bank, except 
for  the  new  balance-sheet  test  and  having  fewer  than  five 
directors, added by FDICIA. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfm22.  12  U.S.C. Section  1821  (n)  (1)  (E)  ,  n  2  A  - C  ,  and 
(n)  (5)  (A)  . 
23.  12 U.S.C.  Section 1821  (n)  (1)  (B)  and (n)  (3)  (A)  .  Thus,  the 
FDIC has virtually  complete discretion  to determine the composition 
of the liabilities and assets of a bridge bank. 
24.  Most of the relevant statutory  amendments made by FDICIA 
are  in  the  FDI  Act.  See  generally  Carnell  (1992) on prompt 
corrective  action under FDICIA and on other legal issues  related to 
FDICIA.  On the  costs of  forbearance, see Woodward  (1992) and 
Thomson (1993). 
25.  See Thomson (1993),  Woodward (1992),  and Carnell (1992). 
26.  See, for example, in the Senate, S. 212, introduced by 
Senator  Dorgan,  and  S.  219,  introduced  by  Senators  Sarbanes, 
Sasser,  Riegle,  and Dorgan,  both on  January 26,  1993.  In the House 
of  Representatives, see  H.R. 28, introduced  by  Representative 
Gonzalez on January 5, 1993, and H.R. 586 and 587, introduced by 
Representatives Hamilton and Obey on January 26, 1993. 
27.  See H.R. 1214, introduced by Representative Gonzalez on 
March 4,  1993. 
28.  See H.R. 1227, introduced by  Representative Leach on 
March 4,  1993. 
29.  Minsky  (1993)  , citing Kregel  (1992)  , observes that "the 
supervision of  the  German banks  [which is located  outside the 
Deutsche Bundesbank,  the central bank] is  much closer  than anything 
contemplated  in  the States.  "  Universal banking performs as it does 
in Germany, I argue, principally because of  a greater and more 
long-standing  tolerance for  corporatist ideas in  German society and 
under German law than has been the case in the United States.  Many  - 
important German financial and industrial combinations would not 
have been allowed under U.  S.  antitrust laws and doctrines that have 
prevailed here for the greater part of a century. 
30.  An important new article on this topic is Roe  (1993). 
31.  See Neier  (1993). 
NOTE ON FURTHER READINGS ON FDIC'IA 
The best  recently prepared  sources of  information on the 
economic and theoretical evolution of FDICIA of which I am aware 
are  Benston and  Kaufman  (1992 and  1993)  .  For  the  legal  and 
theoretical evolution of  FDICIA, see  Carnell  (1992), Pike and 
Thomson (1992),  Todd  (1993),  and Wall  (1993).  The most thorough 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmstatement  of  Federal  Reserve  positions  on  the  bills  that 
subsequently became FDICIA is Greenspan  (1991). 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmREFERENCES 
Benston, George J.  The Separation of Commercial and Investment 
Bankinq:  The Glass-Steasall  Act Revisited and Reconsidered. 
New York:  Oxford University Press, 1990. 
,  and  Kaufman,  George  G.  "The  Intellectual 
History  of  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation 
Improvement Act  of  1991."  Center for Financial and Policy 
Studies, Loyola University of Chicago,  Working Paper No. 93-2 
(draft  dated December 28, 1992)  . 
,  and  .  "Improving the  FDIC 
Improvement Act:  What Was Done and What Still Needs to Be    one to Fix the Deposit Insurance Problem."  Emory University 
and Loyola University  of Chicago.  Unpublished  paper presented 
at the  American Finance  Association's annual  meeting,  Anaheim, 
CAI  January 6,  1993. 
Brandeis, Louis D.  Other People's Monev and How the Bankers Use 
It.  New York:  Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1914.  - 
Carnell,  Richard  Scott.  "A  Partial  Antidote  to  Perverse 
Incentives:  The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991."  In  Rebuilding 
Public  Confidence  throush  Financial  Reform.  Conference 
Proceedings, Ohio State university College of Business, June 
25, 1992,  pp. 31-51. 
England,  Catherine.  "Designing  a Regulatory Structure for the  Next 
60 Years.  Unpublished paper presented at the Jerome Levy 
Institute of Bard College, March 1993. 
Garsson,  Robert.  "Anti-Bias Rules  for  Insurers  Proposed. 
American Banker, March 15,  1993, p. 2. 
Gibbons,  J.  S.  The Banks of New York,  Their Dealers,  the Clearing 
House,  and the Panic of 1857.  New York:  D. Appleton and Co., 
1859. 
Greenspan, Alan.  I1Statement  by Alan Greenspan .  .  .  before the 
Committee on  Banking,  Housing,  and Urban  Affairs,  U.S. Senate,  ' 
April 23, 1991.  Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 77, no. 6 
(June  1991),  pp. 430-443. 
Hamilton, Alexander.  "Opinion  as to the Constitutionality of the 
Bank of the United States,I1  February 23, 17g1.  In The Works 
of Alexander Hamilton,  vol. 3,  pp. 445-493.  Edited by Henry 
Cabot Lodge.  New York:  G.P. Putnam's  Sons  (Knickerbocker 
Press), Federal Edition, 1904. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfm.  I1Report  on a National Bank,  'I  December 13, 
1790.  In The Works of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 3,  pp. 388- 
443.  Edited by Henry Cabot Lodge.  New York:  G.P. Putnam's 
Sons (Knickerbocker  Press),  Federal Edition, 1904. 
Hammond,  Bray.  Banks and Politics in America, from the Revolution 
to the Civil War.  Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University 
Press, 1957. 
Hart,  Albert Bushnell.  Salmon Portland Chase.  Boston:  Houghton 
Mifflin and Co. (Riverside  Press), 1899.  This is vol. 28 in 
the American Statesmen series. 
Hayek, Friedrich A.  The Road to Serfdom.  Chicago:  University of 
Chicago Press, 1944. 
.  The Fatal Conceit:  The Errors of Socialism. 
In The Collected Works of F. A. Havek, vol. 1.  Edited by W. 
W. Bartley,  111.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press,  1988. 
Hoover, Herbert.  The Great  Depression:  1929-1941 (vol. 3 of 
Hoover's memoirs).  New York:  Macmillan Co.,  1952. 
James, Marquis.  The  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson.  Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill  Co., 1938. 
Jefferson,  Thomas.  "Opinion  on  the Constitutionality of a National 
Bank," February 15, 1791.  In  Leqislative and Documentarv 
History of the Bank of the United States (1832)  , pp. 91-94. 
Edited by M.  St. Clair Clarke and  D. A. Hall.  New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1967 (reprint). 
Jones, Jesse H., with Edward Angly. 1 
Thirteen  Years with the RFC (1932-1945)  .  New York:  Macmillan 
Co., 1951. 
Kane, Edward J.  "No  Room for Weak Links in the Chain of Deposit- 
Insurance Reform."  Journal of Financial Services Research, 
vol. 1 (1987),  pp. 77-111. 
.  The S &  L Insurance Mess:  How Did It Happen? 
Washington,  D.C.:  Urban Institute Press, 1989. 
Kaufman,  George  J.  "The  Current  State  of  Banking  Reform." 
Unpublished paper presented at  the Jerome Levy Institute of 
Bard College,  March 1993. 
Keeton,  William R.  !!The  Reconstruction  Finance Corporation:  Would 
It Work Today?" Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,  Economic 
Review (First Quarter 1992),  pp. 33-54. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmKregel, Jan Allen.  German "Universal  Bankinq" as a Model for U.S. 
Bankinq Reform.  Monograph No. 147, Dipartimento di Scienze 
Economiche,  Universita  degli  Studi  di  Bologna  (Italy), 
September 1992. 
McCulloch,  J.  Huston,  and  Yu, Min-Teh.  "Bank Runs,  Deposit 
Contracts, and  Government Deposit  Insurance."  Ohio  State 
University,  Working Paper No. 90-10,  September 1990. 
Madison, James.  Speeches against the bill to incorporate the Bank 
of the United States, February 2 and 7,  1791.  In Leqislative 
and  Documentary Historv of  the Bank  of  the  United  States 
(1832),  pp. 39-35  and 82-85.  Edited by M. St. Clair Clarke 
and  D.  A.  Hall.  New  York:  Augustus  M.  Kelley,  1967 
(reprint)  . 
Mayer, Martin.  The Greatest-Ever Bank Robberv:  The Colla~se  of 
the Savinqs and Loan  Industry.  New  York:  Macmillan Co. 
(Collier  Books), 1992. 
Mengle, David L.  "The  Feasibility of Market Value Accounting for 
Commercial  Banks."  In  Research  in  Financial  Services: 
Private and Public Policv, vol. 3, pp. 157-199.  Edited by 
George G. Kaufman.  Greenwich, CT:  JAI Press Inc., 1991. 
Minsky, Hyman P.  "Financing Prosperity in the  21st  Century: 
Opening Remarks."  Unpublished paper presented at the Jerome 
Levy Institute of Bard College, March 4,  1993. 
Mowry, George E.  The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of 
Modern  America:  1900-1912. New York:  Harper and Row (Harper 
Torchbooks), 1958. 
Neier, Aryeh.  "Watching Rights."  The Nation, vol. 257, no. 10 
(October  4,  1993)  , p. 345. 
- 
Olson, James S.  Savinq Capitalism:  The Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation and the New Deal, 1933  -1940.  Princeton, N.  J.  : 
Princeton University Press, 1988. 
Pecora, Ferdinand.  Wall Street under Oath.  New York:  Simon and 
Schuster, 1939. 
Phillips,  Ronnie J.  The Chicaqo Plan and New Deal Bankinq Reform. 
Book typescript.  Colorado State University.  and the Jerome 
Levy Institute of Bard College, December 7,  1992. 
Pike, Christopher J., and Thomson, James B.  wFDICIA's Prompt 
Corrective  Action  Provisions."  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Cleveland, Economic Commentary, September 1,  1992. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmRoe, Mark J.  I1Some  Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, 
Japan, and the United States.  "  Yale Law Journal, vol. 102 
(June 1993),  pp. 1927-2003. 
Schlesinger,  Arthur M.,  Jr.  The Acre  of Jackson.  Boston:  Little, 
Brown and Co., 1945. 
Simonson, Donald G., and Hempel, George H.  "Banking  Lessons from 
the  Past:  The  1938  Regulatory  Agreement  Interpreted." 
Unpublished paper, University of New Mexico, September 1992, 
presented  at  the  Western  Economic  Association's  annual 
meeting, Lake Tahoe, NV,  June 23, 1993. 
Smith,  Adam.  An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of  Nations  (1776).  Edited  by  Edwin  Cannan.  Chicago  : 
University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
Smith, Rixey, and Beasley, Norman.  Carter Glass:  A Biosraphv 
(1939)  .  New York:  Da Capo Press, 1972 (reprint)  . 
Stevens,  John Austin.  Albert Gallatin.  Boston:  Houghton ~ifflin 
Co. (~iverside  Press), 1898.  This edition is vol. 13 in the 
American Statesmen series. 
Tansill, Charles C., ed.  Documents Illustrative of the Formation 
of  the Union of  the American  States.  69th Congress, 1st 
Session--House  Document No. 398  (1927)  .  Washington, D,  C.  : 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965 (reprint). 
Thomson, James B.  "The Cost.  of Buying Time:  Lessons from the 
Thrift  Debacle." Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,  Economic. 
Commentarv, January 1,  1993. 
Todd,  Walker F.  "History  of and Rationales for the Reconstruction 
Finance  Corporation."  Federal  Reserve Bank  of  Cleveland, 
Economic Review,  vol. 28,  no. 4 (1992  Quarter 4),  pp. 22-35. 
.  "New  Discount Window Policy Is Important Element 
of FDICIA."  Bankinq Policy Report, vol. 12,  no. 5 (March  1, 
1993),  pp. 1,  11-17. A version of this article with somewhat 
different  emphasis  was  published  separately as  "FDICIA1s 
Discount  Window   provision^.'^  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Cleveland, Economic Commentarv, December 15, 1992. 
U.  S  .  Treasury  Department.  Modernizincr  the  Financial  System: 
Recommendations  for  Safer,  More  Competitive  Banks. 
Washington, D.C.:  U.S.  Government Printing Office, February 
1991. 
Wall, Larry D.  "Too-Big-to-Fail  after FDICIA."  Federal Reserve 
Bank  of  Atlanta,  Economic  Review,  vol.  78,  no.  1 
(~anuary/February  1993), pp. 1-14. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmWheelock, David C.  "Discussant Comments on the 1930s Financial 
Reforms  in  Historical  Perspective,  by  Richard  Sylla." 
Unpublished paper presented at  the Jerome Levy Institute of 
Bard College, March 1993. 
White, Eugene N.  "Before  the Glass-Steagall  Act:  An Analysis of 
the  Investment  Banking  Activities  of  National  Banks." 
Ex~lorations  in Economic History,  vol. 23  (1986),  pp. 33-55. 
White, Lawrence H.  Free Bankinq in Britain:  Theorv, Experience. 
and  Debate, 1800-1845.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press, 1984. 
Woodward, Thomas.  "The Return of Forbearance."  House Committee 
on the Budget, Republican Staff Report, Budqet and Economic 
Analysis, vol. 2,  no. 11 (October  9,  1992). 
Wyatt,  Walter.  "Constitutionality of  Legislation  Providing  a 
Unified Commercial  Banking  System  for the  United  States." 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol.  19, no. 3  (March 1933), pp. 
166-186. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmAPPENDIX A 
FROM CONSERVATORSHIP TO PONZI FINANCE 
Before FIRREA (1989),  the conservatorship statute (former  12 
U.S.C.  Section 206) explicitly required conservators of national 
banks  to  segregate  new  deposits  (those received  after  their 
appointment) from previously existing deposits, to make such  prior 
deposits available for withdrawal only on a ratable basis  (which 
could be estimated), and not to use new deposits to liquidate any 
indebtedness of  the  bank  existing prior  to  their  appointment. 
After FIRREA,  Section 206  (c)  provides that the OCC may require the 
conservator to set aside amounts that may be withdrawn safely, in 
the  OCC1s judgment, by  all  depositors  and  creditors  who  are 
similarly  situated.  Thus,  the  OCC  still  might  require  a 
conservator to segregate old  from new deposits, but  the former 
statutory requirement has been made discretionary and therefore is 
subject to political pressures not to segregate.  In fact, in the 
conservatorships created for banks and thrifts since FIRREA, new 
deposits have not been segregated from old deposits. 
The economic effect of  failure to segregate deposits in an 
insolvent  or  prospectively  insolvent  institution  is  to  spread 
uninsured claimants' losses  among all funders  of the federal safety 
net instead of limiting those claimants1  recoveries to the amounts 
reasonably estimated to be realized from the eventual liquidation 
of the conservatorship assets.  The FDIC's bridge banks are also 
susceptible to this criticism because,  while they function  more or 
less like conservatorships, they do not  segregate old from new 
deposits. 
Failure to segregate  deposits in conservatorships  effectively 
creates a Ponzi scheme*/ in which the existing shortfall between 
book and market asset values is merely rolled forward into the new 
asset pool supporting the mixture of both old and new deposits.  In 
the economic modeling  literature, this problem  is addressed in 
formulaic terms by McCulloch and Yu  (1990). 
*/A Ponzi scheme  is  a fraudulent  pyramid scheme in which funds 
placed by new investors  are used to meet demands for  withdrawals or 
returns on investments of earlier investors.  Such schemes are so 
named  because  they  first  became  famous when  one  of  them  was 
unmasked in  Massachusetts in 1920.  The operator  of that scheme  was 
named Charles Ponzi, who died penniless in Brazil in 1949.  See 
Marcia  Grodsky,  I1Charles Ponzi,  in  Encyclopedia  of  American 
Business History and Bioqraphy:  Banking and Finance, 1913-1989, 
pp. 355-59. New York:  Facts on File, Inc.,  1989. 
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